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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MICHAEL SAMUEL WEAVER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900284-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant Michael Samuel Weaver relies on his 
opening brief and also refers this Court to that brief for the 
statements of jurisdiction, the issues, the case, and the facts. 
Appellant replies to the State's brief as follows. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
No court in this state has held that state constitutional 
arguments will be considered only after "concern" has been expressed 
with the federal analysis. The federal and state constitutional 
arguments must be considered separately. Under either analysis, 
probable cause did not exist. 
The "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule is 
inapplicable because the questioned affidavit was conclusory and 
lacked sufficient information. The State has not met its burden of 
proving that the exception applies under either constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE S3EARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT DID NOT ESTABLISH 
PROBABLE CAUSE. 
(Reply to Point I of Appellee's Brief) 
A. APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED 
SEPARATELY UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
In its brief, the State chose not to analyze Appellant 
Weaver's argument under the Utah Constitution. Appellee's 
brief at 8-12. Instead, the State relied upon only a federal 
analysis, reasoning: 
Defendant analyzes his challenge to the trial 
court's probable cause determination separately under 
the United States and the Utah Constitutions, based on 
his interpretation of State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 
(Utah 1990). Larocco involves warrantless searches 
and expresses concern felt by the Utah Supreme Court 
with the direction federal law is moving on that 
issue. The courts of this state have never expressed 
a similar concern about the Gates totality-of-the 
circumstances test. In fact, this Court and the Utah 
Supreme Court have specifically adopted and applied 
that test. 
Appellee's brief at 8 (emphasis in original). 
Appellate courts in Utah may have adopted and applied the 
"totality-of-the-circumstances" test, but the decisions cited by the 
State did not preclude a different analysis under the Utah 
Constitution. See Appellee's brief at 8 (citing State v. Brown, 143 
Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 
1258, 1261 (Utah 1983); and State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1101 
(Utah 1985)). But cf. State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303, 1304 n.l 
(Utah App. 1989). 
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In State v, Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court set forth the appropriate guidelines for making a 
state constitutional argument. Such arguments will be addressed 
only where, as here, the defendant has made a separate analysis: 
We note that neither the State nor defendant has 
discussed or relied independently on article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution, . . . . We 
therefore have treated this case solely under the 
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and 
have relied only on federal law. We have not 
considered separate state constitutional standards, 
even though we are aware that other states are relying 
with increasing frequency on an analysis of the 
provisions of their own constitutions to expand 
constitutional protection beyond that mandated by the 
United States Supreme Court. 
Earl, 716 P.2d at 805 (emphasis added). 
Besides noting the trend of other jurisdictions, the Earl 
Court encouraged Utah attorneys to address criminal issues under the 
Utah Constitution: 
[D]espite our willingness to independently 
interpret Utah's constitution in other areas of the 
law, the analysis of state constitutional issues in 
criminal appeals continues to be ignored. It is 
imperative that Utah lawyers brief this Court on 
relevant state constitutional questions. We cite with 
approval the summary of scholarly commentary and 
analytic technique set forth by the Supreme Court of 
Vermont in State v. Jewett. Vt., 500 A.2d 233 (1985). 
716 P.2d at 806 (citations omitted); see also State v. Larocco, 794 
P.2d 460, 465 (Utah 1990) ("An increasing number of state courts are 
relying on an analysis of the search and seizure provisions of their 
own constitutions to expand or maintain constitutional protection 
beyond the scope mandated by the fourth amendment"); State v. 
Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 234 (Vt. 1985) ("Since 1970 there have been 
- 3 -
over 250 cases in which state appellate courts have viewed the scope 
of rights under state constitutions as broader than those secured by 
the federal constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme 
court"). 
Hence, unlike the cases cited by the State, see Appellee's 
brief at 8 (none of which set forth a different analysis under the 
Utah Constitution), the approach taken in the case at bar discusses 
a different state constitutional standard.1 See generally 
Appellant's opening brief at 21-25. 
1
 Justice Durham has suggested three different models for 
state constitutional arguments. Durham, Employing the Utah 
Constitution in the Utah Courts, Utah B. J. 25, 26 (November 1989) 
(hereinafter referred to as "Employing the Utah Constitution") 
(attached as Addendum A). Under the "primacy" approach, "a state 
court looks first to state constitutional law, develops independent 
doctrine and precedent, and decides federal questions only when 
state law is not dispositive." The "interstitial" approach "reaches; 
a state claim only after determining that federal doctrine does not 
protect the claimed right." And under the "lockstep" approach, "a 
state decides that when its own constitutional language and the 
language of the federal constitution are identical or similar, the 
two should mean what the United States Supreme Court says they 
mean." Id. 
Michael Weaver advocates the primacy model, cf. Linde, 
E Pluribus—Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 
165 (Winter 1984), and the interstitial model under appropriate 
circumstances. Cf. State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 962 (N.J. 1982) 
(Handler, J., concurring) (state law [City of Price v. Jaynes, 113 
Utah 89, 191 P.2d 606, 609 (1948)] predating United States Supreme 
Court decisions [Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)]); see infra 
note 2. The State apparently advocates the lockstep model, an 
approach "raising what one commentator has described as the problem 
of the 'vanishing constitution.'" Durham, Employing the Utah 
Constitution at 27 (citing Collins, Reliance on State 
Constitutions—The Montana Disaster, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1095, 1111 
(1985). The lockstep approach was also implicitly rejected by State 
v. Larocco, 794 P«2d 460 (Utah 1990), as the Court there made a 
separate state constitutional analysis even though the federal and 
state clauses were virtually identical. See id. at 467 n.l. 
-[Footnote continued on next page]-
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As the preceding authority suggests, a state constitutional 
argument may be considered in a number of circumstances, and not 
only when courts "express concern" with federal law. Appellee's 
brief at 8. Appellant Weaver's state constitutional argument should 
be considered more broad than, and independent from, the federal 
analysis.2 
B. PROBABLE CAUSE DID NOT EXIST 
The State argues generally3 that "probability, not a prima 
facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable 
1 [cont'd] The three models suggest only the process for 
addressing state constitutional arguments (i.e. when to address the 
arguments). Once the model is chosen, the substantive techniques of 
State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, (Vt. 1985), may then be considered 
(i.e. how to address the arguments). See Durham, Employing the Utah 
Constitution at 27 (citing six types of arguments advanced by one 
author: the historical, the textual, the doctrinal, the prudential, 
the structural, and the ethical). 
2
 "Prior reliance on federal precedent and federal 
constitutional provisions [does] not preclude us from taking a more 
expansive view of [the state constitution] where the United States 
Supreme Court determines to further limit federal guarantees in a 
manner inconsistent with our prior pronouncements." State v. 
Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465 (Utah 1990) (quoting State v. Jackson, 
102 Wash.2d 432, 439, 688 P.2d 136, 140-41 (1984)); see supra note 1. 
3
 The State also questions defendant Weaver's standing on 
appeal. Appellee's brief at 11 n.l. "[T]he state should not be 
allowed to raise standing for the first time on appeal." State v. 
Marshall. 791 P.2d 880, 886 (Utah App. 1990). During the motion to 
suppress, the State did not attempt to establish that Michael Weaver 
had no expectation of privacy. At most, the State showed that 
Weaver shared access to the shed with his mother or stepbrother. 
(MS 22). However, a shared privacy interest in a locked shed would 
not strip Weaver, one of only two individuals with access to the 
key, of his standing to contest the seizure. See Appellant's 
opening brief at 12 n.5. Moreover, besides the procedural 
deficiency, Michael Weaver's privacy interest (relevant only to 
standing) would have had no bearing on the nexus alleged by Ms. 
Powell. See Appellant's opening brief at 11 n.4. 
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cause for issuance of a search warrant." Appellee's brief at 9 
(citation omitted). The State also contends that Michael Weaver has 
made a "hypertechnical analysis" which should be rejected. 
Appellee's brief at 11. For clarity, Appellant Weaver will simplify 
his arguments. 
A probability of criminal activity is not established when 
a son makes five or six trips to his mother's house (especially when 
the son "frequented his mother's residence, which was only . . . 40 
or 50 yards from where he was living"). Appellant's opening brief 
at 15. Perhaps the outcome may have been different if the "criminal 
activity" (the visits) occurred on May 7, 1989, the day of the 
crime. However, because the questioned activity did not arise until 
four or five days later, May 11, 1989, a parolee suspected of a 
crime and subjected to a search at any time would not keep stolen 
property in his possession for that length of time before deciding 
to move it. Appellant's opening brief at 13, 17-18; cf. Powers' 
Affidavit, page 3 (even Detective Powers acknowledged "that Weaver, 
being on Intense Supervised Parole, would not keep stolen property 
at his primary residence knowing that such a place could and is 
routinely searched by Parole Officers"). The very nature of 
Weaver's status reduced entirely any probability of criminal 
activity. 
Acting on nothing more than a hunch, Detective Powers 
stated his conclusions in the affidavit. It is important to note 
that the Detective had already suspected Weaver and wanted to search 
his house before speaking with Sally Powell. (T 55-56). Once 
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Ms. Powell informed Powers that Weaver had also "frequented" his 
mother's residence (Carol Ahlstrom), Powers decided to expand the 
targeted search area. (T 55-56). Detective Powers simply concluded 
that any place frequented by Weaver should be searched. Probable 
cause did not exist under the federal constitution. 
Alternatively, the Court in City of Price v. Jaynes, 113 
Utah 89, 191 P.2d 606 (1948), expressed an even more restrictive 
test for magistrates considering unreasonable searches or seizures. 
There, the Court condemned undefined standards (of which the 
"totality of the circumstances" is one) because "[t]his leaves the 
tests too much in the air and dependent in each case on what the 
magistrate hearing the case may within the light of his very limited 
or plenary knowledge conclude to be reasonable or unreasonable." 
191 P.2d at 609; see Appellant's opening brief at 19-25. 
By using an objective analysis such as the "two pronged" 
test4 of Aauilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. 
United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), the probable cause determination 
would not vary with the individual knowledge of a given magistrate. 
The two pronged test will remain more consistent than the 
4
 "Many states, for example, have interpreted 'probable 
cause7 in their own search and seizure provisions under the old 
9Aguilar-Spinelli' standard, now rejected by the [United States] 
Supreme Court in favor of an ad-hoc 'totality of the circumstances' 
test. E.g., Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 476 N.E.2d 548, 
556 (1985); State v. Jackson, 102 Wash.2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984); 
People v. Sherbine. 421 Mich. 502, 364 N.W.2d. 658 (1984)[.]" noted 
in Schuman, Advocacy of State Constitutional Law Cases; A Report 
from the Provinces, 2 Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law 
275, 279 (1989). 
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subjective, easily manipulated "totality of the circumstances" 
analysis. See Appellant's opening brief (wherein the veracity and 
basis of knowledge prongs were disputed); see also Illinois v. 
Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 274-91 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
POINT II 
THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY 
(Reply to Point II of Appellee's Brief) 
The State's reliance on the "good faith" exception is 
inapplicable in the case at bar. Because the contested affidavit 
contained insufficient information and conclusory statements, see 
Appellant's opening brief at 11-16, the good faith exception cannot 
nullify the effect of the exclusionary rule. Appellant's opening 
brief at 13 n.7. The State did not sustain its burden of proving 
that the exception applies. State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 186 
(Utah 1987). 
Assuming, arguendo, the federal analysis would allow such 
an exception, the Utah Constitution is not as accommodating.5 As 
stated recently by the Utah Supreme Court, "We now expressly hold 
that the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is a necessary 
consequence of police violations of article I, section 14." State 
v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990). If the police officers 
5
 Other jurisdictions have rejected the Leon "good faith 
exception" based on their own state constitutional or statutory 
provisions. E.g., People v. Bicrelow. 488 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1985); 
State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820 (N.J. 1987); State v. Carter, 370 
S.E.2d 553 (N.C. 1988); State v. Morrissev, 577 A.2d 1060 (Conn. 
1990). 
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here illegally obtained evidence pertaining to Michael Weaver, it 
must necessarily be excluded. Id. Since the State has not provided 
a "good faith exception" analysis under the Utah Constitution, it 
has not fulfilled its burden of proof. Cf. State v. Mendoza, 748 
P.2d 181, 186 (Utah 1987). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Weaver respectfully 
requests that his conviction be reversed and the case remanded for a 
new trial with an order excluding the illegally obtained evidence. 
SUBMITTED this D& day of December, 1990. 
IEN STAM 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
7?^^ 
RONALD S.v FUJINO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that eight copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and 
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 2v day of December, 1990. 
"RK g. fn^ 
RONALD S. F-U^ INO 
DELIVERED by this day 
of December, 1990. 
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ADDENDUM A 
4 * J**K3f*. 
Employing the Utah Constitution 
in the Utah Courts 
These comments deal with what Justice 
Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court 
has referred to as "the original logic of the 
federal system." 
It once again is becoming familiar 
learning that the federal bill of rights 
was drawn from the earlier state dec-
larations of rights adopted at the time 
of independence, that most protection 
of people's rights against their own 
states entered the federal constitution 
only in the Reconstruction amend-
ments of the 1860s, and that it took 
another 100 years and much disputed 
reasoning to equate most of the first 
eight amendments with due process 
under the 14th. 
My own view has long been that a 
state court always is responsible for 
the law of its state before deciding 
whether the state falls short of a 
national standard, so that properly no 
federal issue is reached when the 
state's law protects the claimed 
right...The right question is not 
whether a state's guarantee is the 
same or broader than its federal 
counterpart as interpreted by the 
n i _ : * i c* — n~„-+ T U « 
By Associate Justice Christine M. Durham 
Utah Supreme Court 
CHRISTINE DURHAM is an Associate Justice of the 
Utah Supreme Court. She was appointed to that court 
by Gov. Scott Matheson in 1981, after serving for 
several years on Utah s general jurisdiction trial court. 
As a trial judge, she was President of the Utah District 
Judges Association and Presiding Judge for the Third 
Judicial District in Salt Lake County. Before coming to 
the bench. Justice Durham practiced law in North 
Carolina and in Salt Lake City, and was an adjunct 
professor at the J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brig-
ham Young University. 
Justice Durham has been active in professional and 
community service. She presently is a member of the 
Education Committee of the ABA's Judicial Adminis-
tration Division and serves on the Utah Judicial Coun-
cil's Committee on Judicial Performance Evaluation. 
She was educated at Wellesley College and the Duke 
University School of Law. 
Justice Durham has taught on the subject of State 
Constitutional Law at the ABA's Appellate Judges* 
Seminars and will be teaching a seminar on the subject 
at the University of Utah College of Law during spring 
semester 1989. 
right question is what the state's guar-
antee means and how it applies to the 
case at hand.1 
The Utah Supreme Court has been criti-
cized for "inconsistency" and "indecision" 
in its approach to state constitutional analy-
sis,2 and the criticism is to some extent 
justified. 
In the recent past, the Utah Su-
nrpmp Pnnrt hac hf>rr\rr\t> u/illino tn 
independently interpret Utah's consti-
tution in settling a broad range of 
questions. For instance, the Court has 
developed a right of access to prelimi-
nary hearings under the Utah Consti-
tution not recognized in the federal 
constitution. The Court has held iiat 
the right of parents to maintain the 
parent-child relationship is funda-
mental under the Utah Constitution. 
The Court has developed a separation 
of powers doctrine under the siate 
constitution that prohibits branche.; of 
state government from encroaching 
on the primary functions of coordi-
nate branches. It has interpreted 
Utah's Uniform Operation of the 
Laws provision to invalidate Utah's 
guest statutes. The Court broadened, 
and then recently contracted, protec-
tion against self-incrimination aviil-
able under the Utah Constitution. 
Further, the Utah court has found 
fewer standing requirements under 
the Utah Constitution than under the 
federal constitution. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court 
actively looks to Utah's constitution, 
its decisions are uneven. The Court 
has not developed a consistent ap-
«rr»a^n fr*r r?»c^c in \i/hi/-»n krtth ctat*» 
d federal constitutional claims are 
ide. Some cases fully examine dif-
•ences between the Utah and United 
ates provisions; others rely exclu-
'ely on federal law although state 
tims were presented.3 
e responsibility for this unevenness in 
>ach does not lie entirely with the 
., however. State constitutional pro-
is are occasionally entirely overlooked 
unsel, frequently cited only in passing, 
'ery rarely subjected to the kind of 
il briefing and analysis that is helpful 
; development of doctrine and prece-
The Court has even resorted on occa-
to deploring this circumstance in its 
:n opinions: 
We note.. .that despite our will-
*ness to independently interpret 
ah's constitution in other areas of 
i law, the analysis of state con-
tutional issues in criminal appeals 
ntinues to be ignored It is im-
rative that Utah lawyers brief this 
)urt on relevant state constitutional 
estions We cite with approval 
e summary of scholarly com-
sntary and analytic technique set 
rth by the Supreme Court of Ver-
Dnt in State v. /eweft, Vt., 500 A.2d 
3 (1985).4 • 
e Court needs the help of lawyers to 
to fill the scholarly void surrounding 
interesting questions of state con-
onal law. I offer here some relatively 
>m observations about how the process 
> unfold and what resources may be 
tble to creative lawyers. 
ree different models for state constitu-
analysis have emerged in the litera-
ind case law: (1) the "primacy" ap- , 
h; (2) the "interstitial" or supplemen-
)proach; and (3) the "lockstep" ap-
h. Under the primacy approach, fa-
by Justice Linde and the Oregon court, 
: court looks first to state constitutional 
develops independent doctrine and 
dent, and decides federal questions 
#hen state law is not dispositive. 
The answer [to the question of 
>at the state's constitutional guaran-
means] may turn out the same as 
would under federal law. The 
te's law may prove to be more 
)tectivc than federal law. The state 
/ also may be less protective. In 
X case the Court must go on to 
:ide the claim under federal law, 
uming it has been raised.5 
z interstitial approach, frequently fol-
i by the New Jersey Supreme Court, 
es a state claim only after determining 
ederal doctrine does not protect the 
ed right. It is subject to the criticism 
s use may be result-oriented and there- j 
fore unprincipled. One response to that 
criticism is the development of criteria to 
justify divergence, such as those articulated 
by Justice Handler in his concurring opinion 
in State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 962 (N.J. 
1982), adopted by a unanimous court in 
State v. Williams, 459 A.2d 641 (N.J. 
1983). The seven Hunt criteria that justify a 
result different from one reached by the 
United States Supreme Court are (1) textual 
differences in the federal and state con-
stitutions; (2) "legislative history" for the 
state provision indicating a broader meaning 
than that given the federal language; (3) 
state law predating United States Supreme 
Court decisions; (4) differences in federal 
m and state constitutional structures; (5) sub-
ject matter of particular-state or local inter-
est; (6) particular state history or traditions; 
and (7) public attitudes in the state.6 
Thus, the New Jersey approach 
treats the Supreme Court's reasoning 
and result as presumptively correct 
for state constitutional analysis. As a 
result of this presumption, the state 
court is compelled to explain, in terms 
of the identified criteria, why it is not 
following the Supreme Court prece-
dent. A constitutional interpretation 
"that will stand the test of detached 
criticism" is not enough. Justification 
in this manner raises several critical 
issues: (1) Is disagreement over sub-
stantive constitutional interpretation 
illegitimate? (2) Does the persuasive 
power of Supreme Court decisions 
depend upon the Court's institutional 
position or the soundness of its 
reasoning? Since the New Jersey view 
places a high value on the institutional 
aspect of constitutional interpretation 
at the expense of independent state 
constitutional jurisprudence, it is 
submitted that this approach attributes 
too much to Supreme Court deci-
sions.7 
The third model can be described as 
"lockstep" practice, whereby a state decides 
that when its own constitutional language 
and the language of the federal constitution 
are identical or similar, the two should mean 
what the United States Supreme Court says 
they mean. The Montana Supreme Court 
recently reached such a conclusion. 
The language used in the two con-
stitutions is substantially identical and 
affords no basis for interpreting Mon-
tana's prohibition against self-incrim-
ination more broadly than its federal 
counterpart... 
Moreover, this Court has expressly 
held to the contrary. "The Montana 
constitutional guarantee affords no 
greater protection than that of the fed-
eral constitution." State v. Arm-
strong, supra, 552 P.2d at 619. A year 
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later, we relied on this statement in 
Armstrong and further held, u[t]he 
opinions of the United States Su-
preme Court, therefore, delineate the 
maximum breadth of the privilege 
against self-incrimination in Mon-
tana." State v. Finley, supra, 566 
P.2dat 1121.1 
Under this approach, a state supreme 
court cedes to the United States Supreme 
Court all interpretive powers with respect to 
the language in question, raising what one 
commentator has described as the puzzling 
problem of the "vanishing constitution.*'' 
Utah, like many other states, has never 
explicitly adopted any one (but has at times 
used each) of the foregoing analytic models 
for state constitutional analysis, and lawyers 
should think about the policy implications 
of each approach in structuring state con-
stitutional claims. Lawyers should also con-
sider how basic principles of constitutional 
construction may be brought to bear on state 
constitutional claims. 
Consider Philip Bobbitf s six types 
of argument; the historical, the tex-
tual, the doctrinal, the prudential, the 
structural and the ethical... 
Each of the six types of arguments 
may call for a different decision in one 
state from another state and from de-
cisions under the United States Con-
stitution.10 
This forum does not permit an extended 
discussion of the ways in which each of the 
foregoing arguments might be utilized in a 
Utah constitutional case. A reference to this 
Court's opinion in American Fork v. Cos-
grove, 701 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1985), how-
ever, will illustrate an interesting interplay 
between "textual,*' "historic" and "pru-
dential" considerations in the context of 
article I, Sect. 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
The Vermont Supreme Court included a 
useful discussion of interpretive factors in 
State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985). In 
that case, the Vermont court summarized its 
view of the obligations and opportunities of 
lawyers practicing before it: 
This generation of Vermont law-
yers has an unparalleled opportunity 
to aid in the formulation of a state 
constitutional jurisprudence that will 
protect the rights and liberties of our 
people, however the philosophy of 
the United States Supreme Court may 
ebb and flow. In his correspordence 
with George Wythe, John Adams 
summed up this kind of historic time: 
"You and I, dear friend, have been 
sent into life at a time when the great-
est lawgivers of antiquity would have 
wished to live."11 
Utah lawyers have a similar op x>rtuni 
to assist in the evolution of a rich and ever 
ful state constitutional history. May v 
judges and lawyers take mutual aivantaj 
of it. 
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